Introduction
Over the last few decades, political parties have provided a series of responses to the legitimacy crisis that has affected the party system as a whole. From this perspective, on the one hand simple and more flexible organisational forms were developed (Scarrow 2014) . On the other hand, a 'thrust' towards the implementation of intraparty democracy was experienced by means of including citizens/voters in decision-making processes (Cross and Blais 2012; Bille 2001; Kittilson and Scarrow 2003; Pilet and Cross 2014; Sandri, Seddone and Venturino 2015) . This has been considered by several scholars to be a new attempt made by party leaders to control party members (Katz 2001) , or a strategy to provide party members with incentives to participate (Pennings and Hazan 2001) . However, it was thanks to these initiatives that citizens had the chance to increasingly influence several political environments, first of all the selection of leadership candidates, which had been an exclusive privilege of the 'secret gardens' of politics (Gallagher and Marsh 1988) .
The selection of candidates is, thus, one of the main functions of political parties (Ranney 1981; Sartori 1976) , and it is one of the most important consequences of the process of democracy (Hazan 2008; Hazan and Rahat 2010) . Moreover, in recent years, several political parties have changed the selection of their candidates by means of greater involvement by the bottom and through enhancing the role of party members (Bille 2001; Hazan 2008; Mair 1997; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000) .
The modification of intra-party procedures, sometimes also by means of several types of primary elections, is of great relevance for contemporary politics and has increasingly been studied by scholars. Despite the fact that it has been scarcely studied, the issue of the effects of the primaries and their impact on electoral performance, is of great relevance. This paper attempts to explain the impact of primary elections on the electoral performance of the Republican Party (LR) and the Socialist Party (PS) during the 2017 French presidential elections. From this perspective, the work is divided into several sections. The next section will deal with the literature on the effects of the primaries; section three will analyse the evolution of primary elections in France and their adoption by the LR and the PS; section four will describe the methodological approach to the primaries; section five will show the results of the analysis based on participation and competition; and finally, the last section will focus on several conclusions on the perspective of the study, based on new demands and research hypotheses.
The effects of the primary elections and their impact on electoral performance
Over the last decade, several parties have changed their procedures of selecting their candidates by enhancing the role of party members and non-members. The general trend, therefore, appears to aim at greater inclusiveness (Aylott, Ikstens and Lilliefeldt 2014; Bille 2001; Pennings and Hazan 2001; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000) , although the real level of power transferred to party members and non-members is questionable.
Political parties, therefore, are interested in preserving a membership dimension, both because party members are a source of legitimacy in an era of an increasing lack of interest towards politics, and because they are a useful instrument of immediate mobilisation in electoral campaigns. From this perspective, a way to enhance membership without any other incentive is to give party members greater power in the decision-making process, such as in the case of the selection of candidates.
However, parties have tried to keep their leadership autonomy unaltered in the new procedures of selecting candidates (Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000) . In several cases, the greater inclusion of party members has been strategically used by party leaders to bypass party managers and reach a greater level of autonomy in the leadership itself (Katz 2001; Katz and Mair 1995; Mair 1997 ).
However, the most important issue is the effect of the primaries within the political and party system where they are organised. Greater inclusiveness in the procedure of candidate selection, in fact, could have an impact both on the representation and on the distribution of the power in a political party (Indriðason and Kristinsson 2015) . However, it could also influence the electoral performance of political parties (Hazan and Rahat 2010; Mikulska and Scarrow 2010; Scarrow, Webb and Farrell 2000) . The variability of this phenomenon depends both on the type of procedure adopted and on the profile of the selected candidate (Langstone 2006) . The literature on this matter identifies and supports a dichotomous approach to the effects of the primary elections.
The negative approach allocates a series of 'responsibilities' to the primary elections. Firstly, the primary elections (above all the closed primaries) could favour less competitive candidates. Such a concern is based on two assumptions. First of all, there could be a lack of an electoral strategy by the selectorate, considered as being unable to develop a careful evaluation of the strategic aspects in the choice of the most widely acceptable candidate (Adams and Merrill 2008; Moon 2004 ).
Secondly, there might exist a greater radicalism of the foundation of the party. The latter is based on the fear that inclusion could mobilise more extremist electors that would, in turn, select more extremist candidates (Gerber and Morton 1998) , who would divert from more moderate stances 1 .
Moreover, the primary elections could have an impact on the electoral results in cases of severe intra-party disputes, which would attract public attention and damage the image of the party.
Supporters might also be lost (Hazan and Rahat 2000; Hazan and Rahat 2010) . This explains why parties are distrustful of the primaries, fearing the risk of a negative impact on the electoral result.
The second perspective comes from scholars who maintain that the primaries could, instead, have a positive impact insofar as they might improve the public image of the party and of its candidates, thus building more direct contact with public opinion and facilitating the mobilisation process 2 .
Several researchers, such as Carey and Polga-Hecimovich (2006) , have analysed the Latin American experience, which appears to have negated some of the abovementioned negative effects 3 . In fact, the primary elections tend to reduce the main intra-party controversies, thus enhancing the image of candidates and their ability to attract and collect funds. Therefore, the primary elections are considered (at least in this section of the literature) to be an instrument of electoral success rather than a hindrance.
Moreover, several scholars have demonstrated that a higher level of inclusiveness tends to enhance the participation of selectors with a profile similar to that of electors, and therefore to reduce problems in the selection of candidates and in future perspectives (Mikulska and Scarrow 2010) .
Finally, parties can attract new participants who could be functional to mobilisation in future electoral campaigns.
Based on these perspectives, electoral performance appears to be subject to several conditions. For By considering such theoretical expectations, the scarcity of empirical proofs and the mistrust of several parties towards the employment of the primary elections, this paper analyses whether or not the selection of candidates had any impact on the results of the LR and the PS in the presidential elections. To this end, the paper is organised based on the analytical framework proposed by Hazan and Rahat (2010) , through which it is easier to organise and classify several empirical research areas that deal with candidate selection. In particular, the two authors highlight the concept that the procedures to select candidates are different in terms of the level of the inclusion of selectors based 1 Another assumption is that -more simply -primary elections would develop competition among weak candidates (see Banks and Kiewiet 1989) . 2 Primary elections function as a source of legitimacy and popularity and their adoption is more probable as a consequence of an electoral defeat or when an intra-party change is necessary (see Mikulska and Scarrow 2010; Scarrow 2001 The following paragraphs will attempt to answer two questions: what occurred in France after the 2017 primary elections and the impact of the primaries on electoral performance.
The French presidential primary elections
In France, the first (closed) primary elections were organised by the PS in 1995 4 (see Table 1 ). At the time, approximately 80,000 socialist members selected Lionel Jospin, with 66% of the votes against the then former leader Henri Emmanuelli. Jospin's ability to better manage the presidential campaign allowed his running against Jacques Chirac in the subsequent presidential election, but he obtained only 47% in the runoff (Elgie 1996) . In the 2002 presidential elections, the PS did not hold a primary election due to Jospin, the outgoing prime minister, being the only candidate able to run against the incumbent president Chirac. However, the PS unexpectedly failed to pass the second round; they were overtaken by the leader of the National Front (FN), Jean-Marie Le Pen, and
Chirac, who was then re-elected as president ( The 2007 presidential election represented a turn-around in the evolution of the French primaries (Dolez and Laurent 2007) . Indeed, the PS used a closed primary to select Ségolène Royal with 60.6% of the votes against Dominique Strauss-Kahn (20.8%) and Laurent Fabius (18.6%). Royal, before being appointed by militants, was chosen by the media and public opinion as a potential presidential candidate, using simultaneously an image of political novelty, a political distance from the PS leadership, and her popularity in the polls (Lefebvre 2011 (Lefebvre 2015) .
The 2017 Republican primary
The French right wing introduced primaries in the 2014 municipal elections in order to contrast the internal crisis after the Sarkozy era. Indeed, the LR primary was strongly advocated by Juppé and
Fillon against Sarkozy's personal influence and popularity amongst party members based on the idea that a wider selectorate would be more beneficial. Using a model similar to PS one, the centre- In the runoff round, Fillon won with 66.5% against Juppé at 33.5%.
The unexpected participation of over four million voters allowed them to select, with a wide margin, Fillon against Juppé. Indeed, in the first round, the two departments won by Sarkozy in Metropolitan France passed to Fillon in the second, and of the six departments of Nouvelle Aquitaine who in the first round voted for Juppé, four even switched to Fillon (Fourquet 2017) . His nomination was due to the ability to synthesise the different positions of the party and his public image, at least until the presidential campaign, as an honest politician.
Hypothesis
In this paper we will try to empirically assess the political consequences of the primary elections in The model employed in this paper introduces the result of the Socialist candidate Hamon and that of the candidate for the 2017 presidential elections, Fillon, as dependent variables, while the independent variables are the two key features of primary elections: levels of participation and competition. These two aspects are the main components of our analysis. In fact, the hypothesis is that the performance of parties organising the primaries are, somehow, positively linked to high levels of participation and low levels of competition. Why should such a combination be effective in electoral terms?
First of all, a higher level of participation in the primary elections is a practical validation of a party through its candidates, who are potentially able to intercept voters. Secondly, the emerging image of the party is that of an organisation committed to a dynamic of mobilisation within the framework of a post-modern highly centralised and substantially professionalised electoral campaign (Norris 2000) . On the other hand, high levels of competition create the conditions for a potential electoral defeat of the promoters of the primary elections. Such a perspective makes reference to several theoretical models based on an individual dimension (Anderson et al. 2005) , which are described according to several consequential steps. Firstly, a high level of intra-party competition requires a winner with a narrow margin of votes compared to the other candidates and, as a consequence, there is a large number of selectors that would experience the elimination of their favourite candidate. At this stage, the selectors of the defeated candidates can: 1. go beyond disappointment and collaborate for the victory of the candidate selected by their party, by loyally supporting him/her to the general elections; 2. abstain from voting, because they are unwilling to support a candidate other than the one voted for in the primaries; or 3. vote against their own party, above all if competing parties deploy candidates who for some reason are strongly desired. Several studies highlight the relationship between primary election divisiveness and general election outcomes that causes candidates to do poorly in the general elections (Southwell 1986; Lengle, Owen and Sonner 1995) .
However, other studies (Lazarus 2005) show that primary divisiveness does not cause negative consequences in terms of the general election results. Rather, non-incumbent behaviour can cause the primaries to be divisive. Indeed, these candidates run thinking to win, when the incumbent is vulnerable. This attitude produces divisive primaries in which nominees are penalised in the general elections. Thus, divisiveness without a causal relationship is associated with the general election as an unintended consequence of candidates' behaviour directed to take advantage of a situation to win the general election. General elections are, thus, bound to these types of factors and the choice of a second-best candidate will depend on the voters' intense identification with the party, on the personal features of candidates, the degree of voters' involvement in the electoral campaign and so on. What specifically matters in this analysis is the relationship between high levels of competition and the possibility that this might generate higher abstention, thus causing a lower performance of the candidate promoted in the primary elections.
To this end, the choice to employ these two dimensions as main independent variables, assumes a further assessment. In the case of participation, a relevant issue is the lack of a list of people entitled to participate in the vote, which forms a universal point of reference. The most widely used solution is to have recourse to a valuation quantified as the ratio between the number of selectors who voted in the primaries and the number of electors who voted for the nominee in the general elections.
However, this solution could somehow provide circular reasoning that could be overcome by means of the involvement of people entitled to vote in the previous general elections 7 .
As for competition, the literature proposes a series of methods and related variants. In this paper, we make reference to Kenig's index (2008) , assuming theoretical values between a minimum of 0 and a maximum of 1; it is calculated as the ratio between the effective number of candidates and their actual number. Indeed, the value is calculated by dividing Laakso-Taagepera's index (1979) for the number of real candidates. Despite not being flawless, starting from the excessive importance attributed to candidates who are likely to be insignificant, Kenig's approach remains the most reliable proposal vis-à-vis the employment of other indexes mainly focusing on the performance of the front runner or on the closeness, i.e. the difference of votes between the two at the top of the list.
Moreover, by considering the presence of potential spurious effects, the variable related to the results of the 2012 presidential elections was included, where votes were obtained respectively by the PS candidate Hollande and the LR candidate Sarkozy. In addition, the proposed model also features the performance of the runner-ups in the primaries of the two parties (Valls for the PS and Juppé for the LR). This allows us, as mentioned above, to understand the role of the main nonfrontrunner candidates in order to examine whether or not their role had a causal relationship with the general election. We can thus evaluate the impact of the vote of the main competitors and its dispersal in the presidential elections. Finally, the model presents, following an economic voting approach (Powell and Whitten 1993) , several socioeconomic variables that potentially influence electoral behaviour. Indeed, several studies, both theoretical and empirical, have highlighted the importance of education, income and occupation in terms of the propensity to participate in politics (Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie, Kim 1978) . For this reason, this paper tests the correlation between the (in)dependent variables on the one hand, and the unemployment rate and the wage rate on the other. All of these measures are based on differences from the national average. They allow us to measure the differences between individual departments compared to the national average and to obtain a percentage value that shows the higher or lower capacity of each department compared to the variables analysed.
For this purpose, before testing the model, Tables 2 and 3 identify the correlations that actually exist among the variables. As for the PS (Table 2) , the vote for Hamon in the 2017 presidential elections is strongly related to the primary turnout and the vote for Holland in 2012, with the value of statistical significance being very high. As expected, the competition also has negative correlations.
Instead, in the vote for the runner-up, a statistically significant negative value prevails. Among the economic variables, the matrices present a negative correlation for the unemployment rate and a positive value for the wage rate, although with a low value of statistical significance.
Thus, the 2017 presidential PS vote seems to be positively correlated to the primary participation and the previous presidential vote, with greater propensity in higher income territories. Instead, it would seem to impute a negative correlation with the competition, the vote for Valls, and areas with the highest unemployment rate.
TABLE 2 -HERE
Regarding the LR (Table 3) , the vote for Fillon in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections is also strongly related to the vote for Sarkozy in 2012, but slightly less to the primary turnout, although both have significant values. In this case, the competition has a high negative correlation to the vote of the runner-up. As regards the economic variables, the vote to Fillon is correlated with all three, with a negative value associated with the unemployment rate and a positive value to the wage rate. Thus, Fillon's performance seems to be positively correlated with primary participation and Sarkozy's vote in 2012, with a positive correlation with the wage rate, while his vote has a negative value for the competition, the vote for Juppé and the unemployment rate.
The matrices show how correlations between variables are appropriate to a regression model.
TABLE 3 -HERE
Finally, several elements of the methods should be further specified: first of all, the primaries developed based on a double round system. This has focused attention exclusively on the analysis of the first round and considers the ballot as a new election, which is subject to different criteria, far from the variables taken into account with minor consequences on the analysis. Moreover, the choice of the territorial level of reference (departments, N=96) is linked to the need to functionally overlap the unit of analysis selected by means of the collection and the communication of the results by the promoters of the election. From this perspective, Table 4 displays a regression analysis of the vote for Hamon and Fillon in the presidential elections against the primary turnout, competition, and the five abovementioned control variables. The results reported in the table show that in both cases a control variable, namely the vote gained by Hollande and Sarkozy in the previous presidential elections, reached the higher score. As regards the independent variables, primary turnout in both cases is the second best key predictor, which is higher in the PS case than in that of the LR. Regarding competition, as expected, a negative correlation exists in both models. Whilst the competition is not statistically significant in the PS case, it substantially contributes to the best fit of the model for the LR. Thus, primary turnout would seem to have improved the electoral performance of both parties, whilst primary competition played a damaging role in the LR case but not in that of the PS. Regarding the variables of control, the values obtained by the main challenger in both primary show several peculiarities. In fact, although the LR's vote for Juppé is not significant, the vote for the PS gained from Valls is significant with a negative value with respect to the dependent variable. The other socio-economic variables, however, are not significant in the PS case, although for the case of the right they are present but with a negative value of small significance.
Results

The impact of turnout and competition on the presidential elections
TABLE 4 -HERE Discussion
The results of the regression analysis can be summarised in several points. Firstly, the impact of the primaries on the 2017 presidential elections appears to be correlated, as in the previous studies (De Luca and Venturino 2017), with the citizens' participation which, in both cases, is confirmed as a good starting point for obtaining a strong performance in the general elections. Secondly, competition remains the more complicated variable to analyse, because it causes the conditions required for a possible decrease in support in the general election. Indeed, it is relevant only in the LR case; in the PS case, the main problem concerns the involvement of the runner-up voters defeated by the primary who seem to be relevant in the fit of the model. Thus, the key element is the added value of the citizens' participation, which could improve the results of the candidates selected by the primary, and contain the negative effect of the competition. However, why should we then discuss the failure of the primary elections? The fact that the two main parties did not reach the second round could be one reason for not considering this tool in the selection of candidates.
In fact, the adoption of the primaries into the French party system reveals several problems. Firstly, several scholars describe the different institutional and political contexts in which the primaries take place (Bonetti 2015; Mény 2015) . Indeed, while in North America, the home of primary, the rules of competition are institutionalised by each state, in France they are set by the party promoters without uniformity amongst themselves (Levade 2015) . Moreover, the French two-round electoral system is evaluated as a type of primary (Mény 2017). Finally, the timing of the primary elections, scheduled for a few months before the presidential elections, is not capable of responding to unexpected events during the electoral campaign.
In particular, defeat in the first round of the 2017 presidential elections by candidates selected through the primary was due to several factors. Regarding the PS, the first factor concerns the failure of the presidency of François Hollande. Indeed, the primaries were organised to contain the socialist collapse. For this reason, the PS passed from a role of opposition, such as in the 2011 primaries, to a government role with few chances of obtaining a good result in the presidential elections. The second factor regards the nomination of an unexpected candidate who caused the increase of internal conflict between the pro and cons of Hollande's government and the dispersion of the defeated candidates. As for the LR, after Sarkozy's defeat and the accusations of too much moderation by Juppé, Fillon's nomination was delegitimated by Penelopegate. In spite of that, he refused to withdraw from the competition, with the assertion that the rules did not provide any means of deselection. In this context, several party members supported other candidates, such as
Macron and Le Pen.
Furthermore, on the one side, the outsider candidate Macron was able to obtain moderate support both in Hamon's and Fillon's disappointed electorates. On the other hand, the presence of Melenchon and Le Pen further decreased their extreme electorates, who were able to choose issues and proposals closer to their attitudes.
To conclude, the primaries are not a miraculous instrument capable of solving any problems of the contemporary parties. Indeed, the primaries have shown, on the one hand, the importance of the participation factor, which is one of the predictors of the next general election. On the other hand, they display a weakness related to the inability to heal internal fractures and events that undermine the public image of the parties. a Difference from the National average ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Source: French Socialist Party, The Republicans, Ministry of Interior, and Insee. a Difference from the National average ** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed); * Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). Source: French Socialist Party, The Republicans, Ministry of Interior, and Insee. 
